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Intelligent Interference Exploitation for
Heterogeneous Cellular Networks against
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Abstract—This paper explores the co-existence of a macro cell
and a small cell for heterogeneous cellular networks, where a
macro base station (MBS) and small base station (SBS) transmit
to respective macro user (MU) and small user (SU) through
their shared spectrum in the face of a common eavesdropper.
We consider two spectrum sharing mechanisms, namely the
overlay spectrum sharing (OSS) and underlay spectrum sharing
(USS). In the OSS, MBS and SBS take turns to access their
shared spectrum. By contrast, the USS allows MBS and SBS to
simultaneously transmit over the shared spectrum with the aid of
power control for limiting their mutual interference, thus called
interference-limited USS (IL-USS). In order to take advantage
of mutual interference in confusing the eavesdropper without
causing adverse effect on the MU, we propose an interference-
canceled USS (IC-USS) scheme, where a sophisticatedly-designed
signal is emitted at MBS to cancel out the interference received
at MU, which is also beneficial in terms of defending the
common eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions of overall outage
probability and intercept probability are derived for OSS, IL-
USS and IC-USS schemes by taking into account both MBS-
MU and SBS-SU transmissions. The secrecy diversity analysis
is also carried out by characterizing an asymptotic behavior of
the overall outage probability with a given intercept probability
in the high signal-to-noise ratio region. It is shown that the
secrecy diversity gains of conventional OSS and IL-USS are zero,
whereas the proposed IC-USS achieves a higher secrecy diversity
gain of one. This implies that with an arbitrarily low overall
intercept probability, the conventional OSS and IL-USS methods
converge to their respective outage probability floors, however the
proposed IC-USS scheme can make the overall outage probability
asymptotically decrease to zero by simply increasing the transmit
power. Additionally, numerical results demonstrate an obvious
advantage of the proposed IC-USS over OSS and IL-USS against
eavesdropping.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous cellular networks, spectrum
sharing, interference, physical-layer security, outage probability,
intercept probability, secrecy diversity.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, with an explosive growth of wireless traffic,an increasing research attention from academia and in-
dustry has been paid to the development of future ultra-high
data-rate mobile communications systems e.g. 5G and beyond
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[1]-[3]. As a consequence, heterogeneous cellular networks
consisting of a number of small cells (e.g. pico cells and
femto cells) densely deployed in a macro cell, are emerging
as a means of improving the spectrum efficiency and data rate
of wireless systems [4], [5]. To be specific, in heterogeneous
cellular networks, a macro base station (MBS) and a small
base station (SBS) are allowed to share the same spectrum and
transmit their confidential information to respective users over
the shared spectrum, leading to a higher spectrum utilization
[6], [7]. However, mutual interference between the macro
cell and underlaying small cells may arise and severely de-
grades the quality-of-service (QoS) of heterogeneous cellular
networks. To this end, power control and allocation [8]-[10]
as well as interference alignment and management [11], [12]
have been widely studied to suppress the mutual interference
in heterogeneous cellular networks for system performance
improvement.
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature and inherent open-
ness of wireless communications, an eavesdropper may wire-
tap both the macro-cell and small-cell transmissions, as long
as it lies in the coverage of heterogeneous cellular networks. In
order to defend against eavesdropping attacks, cryptographic
methods are generally employed in cellular networks to guar-
antee the transmission confidentiality at the expense of extra
computational complexity and latency resulted from the secret
key management and encryption/decryption algorithms [13].
Alternatively, physical-layer security emerges as a promising
paradigm to achieve the perfect secrecy by taking full advan-
tage of physical characteristics of wireless channels [14], [15].
In [16], Wyner first proved that if the wiretap channel spanning
from a source to an eavesdropper is a degraded version of the
main channel spanning from the source to its desired receiver,
a perfect secrecy can be achieved without any confidential
information leakage to the eavesdropper. Later on, the authors
of [17] introduced a notion of secrecy capacity shown as
the difference between the capacity of main channel and that
of wiretap channel, which is severely degraded in wireless
fading environments. As a consequence, extensive efforts were
devoted to examining the use of multiple antennas [18]-[21],
multiuser scheduling [22] and cooperative relays [23]-[25] for
enhancing the secrecy capacity for wireless communications.
Also, there is a significant amount of research work focused
on physical-layer security for heterogeneous spectrum-sharing
networks [26]-[28], including cognitive radio (CR) networks
and device-to-device (D2D) underlay cellular networks. More
specifically, CR enables an unlicensed wireless network (often
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referred to as secondary network) to access licensed spectrum
resources that are not occupied by a primary network [26],
[27], where the secondary network has a lower priority than
the primary network in accessing the licensed spectrum. By
contrast, in D2D underlaying cellular networks [28], D2D
communication means a direct link between two cellular users
without traversing a base station (BS), which is allowed to
share the same spectrum with its underlaying cellular links
between BS and associated users. In [29] and [30], the secrecy
capacity and outage performance of secondary transmissions
were studied with a QoS guarantee of primary transmissions
for CR networks. The security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) for
CR systems was investigated in [31] and two relay selection
schemes were proposed for SRT improvement, namely the
single-relay selection and multi-relay selection. Additionally,
physical-layer security for D2D underlaying cellular networks
was studied in [32] by exploiting D2D scheduling to guarantee
the secrecy performance of cellular communications. The
authors of [33] further examined the maximization of secrecy
capacity through power allocation between D2D and cellular
links for D2D underlaying cellular networks.
In this paper, we explore physical-layer security for a het-
erogeneous spectrum-sharing cellular network consisting of a
macro cell and a small cell, where a MBS and an SBS transmit
to their respective macro user (MU) and small user (SU) and
an eavesdropper intends to wiretap both MBS-MU and SBS-
SU transmissions. The overlay spectrum sharing (OSS) and
underlay spectrum sharing (USS) are considered for MBS-MU
and SBS-MU links to access the same spectrum. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First,
we propose an interference-canceled USS (IC-USS) scheme to
take full advantage of mutual interference between the macro
cell and small cell in confusing the common eavesdropper. To
be specific, the USS enables both MBS and SBS to transmit
their messages simultaneously, and thus leads to the mutual
interference which has an adverse effect on decoding source
messages at legitimate MU and SU, but is also beneficial to
confuse the eavesdropper. To alleviate the mutual interference,
power control is utilized in conventional interference-limited
USS (IL-USS) scheme. By contrast, in our IC-USS scheme,
a special signal is sophisticatedly designed for interference
cancelation to reduce the adverse impact of mutual inter-
ference on legitimate MU and SU, which simultaneously
generates certain interference to the undesired eavesdropper.
Second, we derive closed-form expressions of overall outage
probability and intercept probability for both MBS-MU and
SBS-SU transmissions relying on the conventional OSS and
IL-USS as well as our IC-USS schemes. Finally, the secrecy
diversity analysis of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes is
conducted by characterizing an asymptotic behavior of the
overall outage probability with a given intercept probability
in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region.
The reminder of this paper are organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide the system model of heterogeneous
spectrum-sharing cellular networks and propose OSS, IL-USS
and IC-USS schemes. Next, we analyze the overall outage
probability and intercept probability for OSS, IL-USS and IC-
USS in Section III, followed by Section IV, where the secrecy
diversity analysis is carried out. Then, we present numerical
results of the overall outage probability and intercept proba-
bility in Section V. Finally, Section VI gives some concluding
remarks.
II. SPECTRUM SHARING FOR HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS
NETWORKS
In this section, we first present the system model of a het-
erogeneous macro-cell and small-cell wireless system, where
an eavesdropper is assumed to tap any active transmissions
in both the macro cell and small cell. Then, we consider two
different spectrum sharing mechanisms for the heterogeneous
wireless system, namely the overlay spectrum sharing (OSS)
and underlay spectrum sharing (USS).
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a heterogeneous wireless
system consisting of a macro cell and a small cell, where a
macro base station (MBS) and small base station (SBS) trans-
mit their confidential messages to respective intended users,
called macro user (MU) and small user (SU), respectively. It
needs to be pointed out that MBS and SBS are connected to
a core network, e.g., a mobility management entity (MME)
in the long term evolution (LTE) or a mobile switch center
(MSC) in global system for mobile communication (GSM),
through which reliable information exchange can be achieved
between MBS and SBS. Presently, such a heterogeneous
cellular architecture of embedding small base stations (e.g.
pico/femto base stations) into a macro cell has been adopted
in long term evolution-advanced (LTE-A) network [4], which
is capable of substantially improving spectral efficiency and
attractive to future evolved wireless networks.
In Fig. 1, a passive eavesdropper (E) is considered to tap
MBS-MU and SBS-SU transmissions and assumed to know
everything about the confidential transmissions (e.g., encryp-
tion/decryption algorithms and secret keys) except the source
messages. Since the eavesdropper is passive, the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is assumed to be
unavailable in this paper. Although only a macro cell, a small
cell and an eavesdropper are included in the system model,
a possible future extension may be considered for a large-
scale heterogeneous network consisting of multiple MUs, SUs
and eavesdroppers with the aid of user scheduling [22] and
stochastic geometry [34], [35]. Moreover, in the heterogeneous
wireless system of Fig. 1, the macro cell and small cell
share the same spectrum resources. Throughout this paper, we
consider two different spectrum sharing mechanisms i.e. OSS
and USS.
To be specific, in the OSS mechanism, a given spectrum
band is divided into two orthogonal parts, which are allocated
to the macro cell and small cell, respectively. In this manner,
MBS and SBS transmit their messages over two orthogonal
sub-bands without mutual interference. By contrast, the USS
strategy allows MBS and SBS to transmit over the same
spectrum band simultaneously with the aid of power control
to limit the mutual interference level for the QoS guarantee.
For national convenience, let PM and PS respectively denote
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Fig. 1. A heterogeneous cellular network consisting of a macro cell and a
small cell in the presence of a common eavesdropper.
transmit powers of MBS and SBS, where subscripts M and
S represent MBS and SBS, respectively. Moreover, data rates
of the MBS-MU and SBS-SU transmissions are denoted by
RoM and R
o
S , respectively. Throughout this paper, all the
wireless links between any two nodes of Fig. 1 are modeled
as Rayleigh fading. In addition, any receiver of Fig. 1 is
assumed to encounter the zero-mean additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with a variance of N0.
B. Conventional OSS
In this section, we consider the conventional OSS scheme
as a baseline. As aforementioned, in the OSS scheme, a given
spectrum band is first divided into two orthogonal sub-bands
which are then assigned to the macro cell and small cell,
respectively. As a result, no interference occurs between the
macro cell and small cell, when MBS and SBS transmit to
their respective users. We consider that a fraction of the total
spectrum α is assigned to MBS and the remaining spectrum is
allocated to SBS, wherein 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We consider that MBS
and SBS transmit their signals xM and xS at the power of PM
and PS , respectively, where E(|xM |
2) = 1, E(|xS |
2) = 1, and
E(·) denotes an expectation operator. Thus, the received signal
at MU can be expressed as
yOSSm = hMm
√
PMxM + nm, (1)
where subscript m represents MU, hMm denotes the fading
gain of MBS-MU channel, and nm is the AWGN encountered
at MU. Also, the received signal at SU is similarly written as
yOSSs = hSs
√
PSxS + ns, (2)
where subscript s represents SU, hSs denotes the fading
gain of SBS-SU channel, and ns is the AWGN encountered
at SU. Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of wireless
transmission, the signal transmissions of MBS and SBS may
be overheard by E and the corresponding received signals are
expressed as
yOSSMe = hMe
√
PMxM + ne (3)
and
yOSSSe = hSe
√
PSxS + ne, (4)
where subscript e represents the eavesdropper, hMe and hSe
denote the fading gains of MBS-E and SBS-E channels, and ne
is the AWGN encountered at E. Using the Shannon’s capacity
formula, we can obtain the channel capacity of MBS-MU and
that of SBS-SU from (1) and (2) as
COSSMm = αlog2(1 + γM |hMm|
2), (5)
and
COSSSs = (1 − α)log2(1 + γS |hSs|
2), (6)
where α represents the fraction of the total spectrum as-
signed to the MBS-MU transmission, γM = PM/N0 and
γS = PS/N0 are referred to as signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
of MBS and SBS, respectively. Similarly, from (3) and (4), the
channel capacity of MBS-E and that of SBS-E are obtained
as
COSSMe = αlog2(1 + γM |hMe|
2), (7)
and
COSSSe = (1 − α)log2(1 + γS |hSe|
2). (8)
It is pointed out that hMm, hSs, hMe and hSe are modeled
as independent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables
with respective variances of σ2Mm, σ
2
Ss, σ
2
Me and σ
2
Se.
C. Conventional IL-USS
In this section, we present an interference-limited underlay
spectrum sharing (IL-USS) scheme, where MBS and SBS
are allowed to access the spectrum simultaneously and the
transmit power of SBS shall be limited to ensure its induced
interference to the MBS-MU transmission below a tolerable
level for the QoS guarantee. As a consequence, when MBS
sends its message xM to MU at a power of PM , SBS
simultaneously transmits xS to SU at a power of Ps over the
same spectrum band, leading to the fact that a mixed signal of
xM and xS is received at MU and SU. Hence, we can express
the received signals at MU and SU as
yIL-USSm = hMm
√
PMxM + hSm
√
PSxS + nm, (9)
and
yIL-USSs = hSs
√
PSxS + hMs
√
PMxM + ns, (10)
where hSm and hMs represent fading gains of SBS-MU
and MBS-SU channels, respectively. Meanwhile, due to the
broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, the eavesdropper
may overhear the signal transmissions of MBS and SBS.
Therefore, the corresponding received signal at E can be
written as
yIL-USSe = hMe
√
PMxM + hSe
√
PSxS + ne. (11)
According to the Shannon’s capacity formula and using (9)
and (10), we may obtain the channel capacity of MBS-MU
and that of SBS-SU as
CIL-USSMm = log2(1 +
γM |hMm|
2
γS |hSm|2 + 1
), (12)
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and
CIL-USSSs = log2(1 +
γS |hSs|
2
γM |hMs|2 + 1
). (13)
Additionally, the eavesdropper attempts to interpret the
confidential messages of xM and xS based on its received
signal as given by (11). For simplicity, we here consider
that the eavesdropper decodes xM and xS separately without
using successive interference cancelation [36]. Indeed, more
useful information may be tapped by an eavesdropper with
the successive interference cancelation, which can be similarly
adopted at the MU and SU for achieving a better transmission
reliability performance. Hence, no additional benefits can be
achieved for our heterogeneous cellular networks from an
SRT perspective by employing the successive interference
cancelation at both the MU and SU as well as the eaves-
dropper. It is of interest to explore an impact of successive
interference cancelation on the secrecy performance of our
IC-USS scheme, which may be considered for future work.
Treating xS as interference, we obtain the channel capacity of
MBS-E from (11) as
CIL-USSMe = log2(1 +
γM |hMe|
2
γS |hSe|2 + 1
). (14)
Also, the eavesdropper may decode xs based on (11) and the
channel capacity of SBS-E is similarly given by
CIL-USSSe = log2(1 +
γS |hSe|
2
γM |hMe|2 + 1
). (15)
D. Proposed IC-USS
In this section, we propose an interference-canceled under-
lay spectrum sharing (IC-USS) scheme, where MBS and SBS
simultaneously transmit their signals of xM and xS over the
same spectrum band and may interfere with each other. In
order to cancel out the interference received at MU from SBS,
a special signal denoted by xm is sophisticatedly designed
and transmitted at MBS. This means that MBS shall transmit
a mixed signal of xM and xm simultaneously, which are
utilized to carry the desired information and to cancel out
the interference received at MU, respectively. For notational
convenience, let Pm and P¯m denote the instantaneous and
average transmit power of xm, respectively. Moreover, the
transmit power of xM is considered to be PM − P¯m, where
PM ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ P¯m ≤ PM . This implies that an average
transmit power of the mixed signal of xM and xm is PM ,
which guarantees a fair comparison with the IL-USS scheme
in terms of the average power consumption. While MBS
sends its mixed signal of xM and xm, SBS also transmits
xS with a weight coefficient wS at a power of PS , wherein
E(|wS |
2 = 1). Thus, we can express the received signal at
MU as
yIC-USSm = hMm(
√
PM − P¯mxM + xm)
+ hSm
√
PSwSxS + nm
= hMm
√
PM − P¯mxM
+ (hMmxm +
√
PShSmwSxS) + nm.
(16)
In order to cancel out the interference received at MU, both
the specially-designed signal xm and the weight coefficient
wS should satisfy the following equality
hMmxm +
√
PShSmwSxS = 0, (17)
from which infinite solutions are available for the interference
neutralization. Throughout this paper, a solution of [xm, wS ]
to the preceding equation is given by
[xm, wS ] =
1
σMm
[−
√
Ps|hSm|e
−jθMmxS , |hMm|e
−jθSm ],
(18)
where σ2Mm = E(|hMm|
2) is the channel variance of MBS-
MU, θMm and θSm denote the channel phase of MBS-MU
and that of SBS-MU, respectively. It can be observed from
(18) that hMm, hSm, σ
2
Mm, PS and xS should be known at
MBS and SBS for an appropriate design of [xm, wS ]. Thanks
to that MBS and SBS are connected the core network through
wire cables as shown in Fig. 1, MBS can easily acquire
the exact information of PS and xS from SBS via the core
network. Moreover, the CSIs of hMm, hSm and σ
2
Mm could
be estimated at MU and then fed back to MBS and SBS
[37]. From (18), one can readily obtain the instantaneous and
average transmit powers of xm as
[Pm, P¯m] = [
|hSm|
2
σ2Mm
PS ,
σ2Sm
σ2Mm
PS ], (19)
where σ2Sm = E(|hSm|
2) is the channel variance of SBS-MU.
Noting that the average transmit power of xm (i.e., P¯m) should
be in the range of 0 ≤ P¯m ≤ PM and using (19), we obtain
the following inequality
PM
PS
≥
σ2Sm
σ2Mm
, (20)
which is a necessary condition for MBS to cancel out the
interference received at MU. In other words, as long as the
transmit power PM of MBS is sufficiently high to satisfy
(20), it is possible to perfectly cancel out the interference
received at MU from SBS by employing a specially-designed
signal xm and weigh coefficient wS of (18). It is worth
mentioning that although the sophisticatedly-designed signal
xm can be employed to neutralize the mutual interference
as well as to confuse the eavesdropper, it comes at the cost
of consuming partial transmit power that could be used for
transmitting the desired information-bearing signal xM . It is
of interest to investigate the power allocation between the
sophisticatedly-designed signal and information-bearing signal
in terms of maximizing the secrecy rate of wireless transmis-
sions. Moreover, an optimal solution of [xm, wS ] may also
be considered for further enhancing the secrecy performance,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Substituting xm and
wS from (18) into (16) gives
yIC-USSm = hMm
√
PM − P¯mxM + nm, (21)
where P¯m is given by (19). Also, we can express the received
signal at SU as
yIC-USSs = hSs
√
PSwSxS+hMs(
√
PM − P¯mxM + xm)+ns,
(22)
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where xm and wS are given by (18). Meanwhile, the eaves-
dropper may overhear the signal transmissions from MBS and
SBS, thus the corresponding received signal can be written as
yIC-USSe = hMe(
√
PM − P¯mxM + xm)+hSe
√
PSwSxS+ne.
(23)
Applying the Shannon’s capacity formula to (21), we can
obtain the channel capacity of MBS-MU transmission relying
on the proposed IC-USS scheme as
CIC-USSMm = log2[1 + (γM − γ¯m)|hMm|
2], (24)
where γM = PM/N0 and γ¯m = P¯m/N0. Similarly, by
treating both xM and xm as interference, the channel capacity
of SBS-SU transmission relying on our IC-USS scheme can
be obtained from (22) as
CIC-USSSs = log2[1 +
|hSs|
2|hMm|
2
γS/σ
2
Mm
|hMs|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1
], (25)
where γS = PS/N0 and γm = Pm/N0. Moreover, the
eavesdropper may exploit its overheard signal of (23) to
decode the confidential messages of xM and xS . Similar
to the conventional IL-USS, we consider that xM and xS
are decoded independently at the eavesdropper without using
successive interference cancelation. Thus, treating xm and xS
as interference, we obtain the MBS-E channel capacity from
(23) as
CIC-USSMe = log2[1+
|hMe|
2(γM − γ¯m)
|hMe|2γm + |hSe|2|hMm|2γS/σ2Mm + 1
].
(26)
Similarly, by using (23) and treating xM and xm as interfer-
ence, the SBS-E channel capacity can be given by
CIC-USSSe = log2[1 +
|hSe|
2|hMm|
2
γS/σ
2
Mm
|hMe|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1
], (27)
which completes the system model of our IC-USS scheme.
III. SRT ANALYSIS OF SPECTRUM SHARING SCHEMES
In this section, we present the SRT analysis of conventional
OSS and IL-USS as well as proposed IC-USS schemes over
Rayleigh fading channels. As discussed in [38], the security
and reliability of wireless communications are characterized
by the intercept probability and outage probability experienced
at the eavesdropper and legitimate receiver, respectively. Let
us first recall the definitions of intercept probability and outage
probability. According to physical-layer security literature
[38], [39], a source message with a secrecy rate of Rs needs
to be encoded by a secrecy encoder, generating an overall
codeword with an increased rate Ro to be transmitted to the
destination. It is pointed out that the rate difference Ro −Rs
represents an extra redundancy introduced for the sake of
defending against eavesdropping. The definition of intercept
probability and outage probability is detailed as follows.
Definition 1: According to the Shannon’s coding theorem,
when the capacity of the main channel spanning from the
source to legitimate destination falls below the transmission
rate Ro, it is impossible for the destination to successfully
decode the source message and an outage event occurs in this
case. Thus, by letting Cm denote the capacity of main channel,
the probability of occurrence of outage event (referred to as
outage probability) is expressed as
Pout = Pr (Cm < Ro). (28)
Definition 2: As discussed in [38] and [39], if the capacity of a
wiretap channel is higher than the rate difference of Ro−Rs,
perfect secrecy is not achievable and an intercept event is
considered to happen. Hence, the probability of occurrence of
intercept event (called intercept probability) is given by
Pint = Pr (Ce > Ro −Rs) , (29)
where Ce represents the capacity of wiretap channel.
One can observe from (28) and (29) that the outage proba-
bility and intercept probability affect each other with respect
to an intermediate parameter Ro. In what follows, we present
the analysis of outage probability and intercept probability
for the OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for the sake
of quantitatively characterizing their security and reliability
relationship.
A. Conventional OSS
This subsection analyzes the outage probability and inter-
cept probability of macro-cell and small-cell transmissions
relying on the conventional OSS approach. Without loss of any
generality, let RoM and R
o
S represent the overall data rates of
MBS-MU and SBS-SU transmissions, respectively. From (28),
the outage probability of MBS-MU transmission is obtained
as
POSSMm-out = Pr
(
COSSMm < R
o
M
)
, (30)
where COSSMm is given by (5). Substituting C
OSS
Mm from (5) into
(30) yields
POSSMm-out = Pr
(
αlog2(1 + γM |hMm|
2) < RoM
)
= Pr
(
|hMm|
2 < ∆M
)
,
(31)
where ∆M = (2
RoM
α − 1)/γM . Noting that |hMm|
2 is an
exponentially distributed random variable with a mean of
σ2Mm, we arrive at
POSSMm-out = 1− exp(−
∆M
σ2Mm
). (32)
Similarly, using (6) and (28), the outage probability of SBS-
SU transmission is given by
POSSSs-out = Pr
(
COSSSs < R
o
S
)
. (33)
Substituting COSSSs from (6) into (33) yields
POSSSs-out = 1− exp(−
∆S
σ2Ss
), (34)
where ∆S = (2
RoS
1−α − 1)/γS and σ
2
Ss is an expected value of
the exponentially distributed random variable of |hSs|
2.
Additionally, for notational convenience, let RsM and R
s
S
denote secrecy rates of MBS-MU and SBS-SU transmissions,
respectively. Moreover, the random variables of |hMe|
2 and
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|hSe|
2 are independent exponentially distributed with respec-
tive means of σ2Me and σ
2
Se. Using (7) and (29), we can obtain
the intercept probability of MBS-E wiretap channel as
POSSMe-int = Pr
(
COSSMe > R
o
M −R
s
M
)
= exp(−
∆dM
σ2Me
), (35)
where ∆dM = (2
RoM−R
s
M
α − 1)/γM . Similarly, from (8) and
(29), the intercept probability of SBS-E wiretap channel is
given by
POSSSe-int = Pr
(
COSSSe > R
o
S −R
s
S
)
= exp(−
∆dS
σ2Se
), (36)
where ∆dS = (2
RoS−R
s
S
1−α − 1)/γS .
So far, we have derived closed-form expressions of outage
probability and intercept probability for macro-cell and small-
cell transmissions separately, as shown in (32) and (34)-(36).
In order to show a coupled effect between the macro-cell
and small-cell transmissions, we here define an overall outage
probability of the macro cell and small cell by the product
of their individual outage probabilities. As a consequence, an
overall outage probability for the conventional OSS scheme
can be expressed as
POSSout = P
OSS
Mm-out × P
OSS
Ss-out, (37)
where POSSMm-out and P
OSS
Ss-out are given by (32) and (34), re-
spectively. Similarly, an overall intercept probability of the
heterogeneous macro cell and small cell can be defined as the
product of their individual intercept probabilities. Hence, an
overall intercept probability for the conventional OSS scheme
is written as
POSSint = P
OSS
Me-int × P
OSS
Se-int, (38)
where POSSMe-int and P
OSS
Se-int are given by (35) and (36), respec-
tively.
B. Conventional IL-USS
This subsection presents the SRT analysis of IL-USS
scheme. Using (12) and (28) and noting that |hMm|
2 and
|hSm|
2 are independent exponentially distributed random vari-
ables with respective means of σ2Mm and σ
2
Sm, we can obtain
the outage probability of MBS-MU transmission relying on
the IL-USS scheme as
P IL-USSMm-out = Pr
(
CIL-USSMm < R
o
M
)
= Pr
(
|hMm|
2 < (γS |hSm|
2 + 1)ΛM
)
= 1−
σ2Mm
γSσ2SmΛM + σ
2
Mm
exp(−
ΛM
σ2Mm
),
(39)
where ΛM = (2
RoM − 1)/γM . From (13) and (28), the outage
probability of SBS-SU transmission is given by
P IL-USSSs-out = Pr
(
CIL-USSSs < R
o
S
)
= Pr
(
|hSS |
2 < (γM |hMs|
2 + 1)ΛS
)
= 1−
σ2Ss
γMσ2MsΛS + σ
2
Ss
exp(−
ΛS
σ2Ss
),
(40)
where ΛS = (2
RoS − 1)/γS and σ
2
Ms is a mean of the
exponentially distributed random variable |hMs|
2. Similar to
(37), an overall outage probability for the conventional IL-USS
scheme can be obtained as
P IL-USSout = P
IL-USS
Mm-out × P
IL-USS
Ss-out , (41)
where P IL-USSMm-out and P
IL-USS
Ss-out are given by (39) and (40),
respectively.
Additionally, from (14), (15) and (29), we can obtain
intercept probabilities experienced over MBS-E and SBS-E
wiretap channels as
P IL-USSMe-int = Pr
(
CIL-USSMe > R
o
M −R
s
M
)
= Pr
(
|hMe|
2 > (γS |hSe|
2 + 1)ΛdM
)
=
σ2Me
σ2Me + γSσ
2
SeΛ
d
M
exp(−
ΛdM
σ2Me
),
(42)
and
P IL-USSSe-int = Pr
(
CIL-USSSe > R
o
S −R
s
S
)
= Pr
(
|hSe|
2 > (γM |hMe|
2 + 1)ΛdS
)
=
σ2Se
σ2Se + γMσ
2
MeΛ
d
S
exp(−
ΛdS
σ2Se
),
(43)
where ΛdM = (2
RoM−R
s
M − 1)/γM and Λ
d
S =
(2R
o
S−R
s
S − 1)/γS . Therefore, an overall intercept probability
of the conventional IL-USS scheme can be similarly defined
as the product of individual intercept probabilities of P IL-USSMe-int
and P IL-USSSe-int , namely
P IL-USSint = P
IL-USS
Me-int × P
IL-USS
Se-int , (44)
where P IL-USSMe-int and P
IL-USS
Se-int are given by (42) and (43), respec-
tively.
C. Proposed IC-USS
In this subsection, we carry out the SRT analysis of pro-
posed IC-USS scheme by deriving its closed-form outage
probability and intercept probability. From (24) and (28), an
individual outage probability of the MBS-MU transmission
relying on the proposed IC-USS scheme is given by
P IC-USSMm-out = Pr
(
CIC-USSMm < R
o
M
)
= 1− exp(−
ΛM
σ2Mm − βσ
2
Sm
),
(45)
where β = γS/γM is referred to as the small-to-macro ratio
(SMR). Using (25), we can obtain an individual outage prob-
ability of the SBS-SU transmission for the IC-USS scheme
as
P IC-USSSs-out = Pr
(
|hSs|
2|hMm|
2
|hMs|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1
< ΛSσ
2
Mm
)
= Pr
(
|hSs|
2|hMm|
2
|hMs|2(ΛSσ2MmγM +XSm) + ΛSσ
2
Mm
< 1
)
where XSm = (2
RoS − 1)(|hSm|
2 − σ2Sm). It is challenging
to derive an exact closed-form expression for P IC-USSSs-out . Let us
consider an asymptotic case of 2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0, for which the
random variable XSm is equal to zero with the probability of
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one, since its mean and variance both approach to zero. Thus,
we have
P IC-USSSs-out = Pr
(
|hSs|
2|hMm|
2
|hMs|2ΛSσ2MmγM + ΛSσ
2
Mm
< 1
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
σ2Ssx
σ2MsΛSγM + σ
2
Ssx
exp(−x−
ΛS
σ2Ssx
)dx,
(46)
for 2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0. Using (45) and (46), we can obtain an
overall outage probability for the proposed IC-USS scheme as
P IC-USSout = P
IC-USS
Mm-out × P
IC-USS
Ss-out . (47)
In addition, from (26) and (29), an intercept probability en-
countered by MBS-E wiretap channel relying on the proposed
IC-USS scheme is given by
P IC-USSMe-int = Pr
(
CIC-USSMe > R
o
M −R
s
M
)
= Pr
(
|hMe|
2(γM − γ¯m)
|hMe|2γm + |hSe|2XMmγS + 1
> γMΛ
d
M
)
= Pr
(
|hMe|
2YSm > Λ
d
M (|hSe|
2XMmγS + 1)
)
,
(48)
where XMm =
|hMm|
2
σ2Mm
and YSm = 1 −
β
σ2Mm
[σ2Sm +
|hSm|
2(2R
o
M−R
s
M − 1)]. We can rewrite (48) as
P IC-USSMe-int = Pr(YSm > 0)Pr(|hMe|
2YSm
> ΛdM (|hSe|
2XMmγS + 1)|YSm > 0).
Here, we also consider an asymptotic case of 2R
o
Mσ2Sm → 0,
for which an equality |hSm|
2(2R
o
M−R
s
M − 1) =
σ2Sm(2
RoM−R
s
M − 1) holds with the probability of one, leading
to YSm = 1 − σ
2
Smβ2
RoM−R
s
M /σ2Mm and Pr(YSm > 0) = 1.
Substituting these results into the preceding equation yields
P IC-USSMe-int = Pr
(
|hMe|
2Ω > ΛdM (|hSe|
2XMmγS + 1)
)
,
where Ω = 1 − σ2Smβ2
RoM−R
s
M /σ2Mm. Noting that |hMe|
2,
|hSe|
2 and XMm are independent exponentially distributed
random variables with respective means of σ2Me, σ
2
Se and 1,
we arrive at
P IC-USSMe-int = Θexp(Θ−
ΛdM
σ2MeΩ
)Ei(Θ), (49)
for 2R
o
Mσ2Sm → 0, where Θ =
Ωσ2Me
ΛdMσ
2
Seγs
and Ei(Θ) =∫∞
Θ t
−1e−tdt. Using (27) and (29), we can obtain an intercept
probability experienced over SBS-E wiretap channel for the
proposed IC-USS scheme as
P IC-USSSe-int = Pr
(
CIC-USSSe > R
o
S −R
s
S
)
= Pr
(
|hSe|
2|hMm|
2
|hMe|2(ΛdSσ
2
MmγM + ZSm) + Λ
d
Sσ
2
Mm
> 1
)
,
(50)
where ZSm = (2
RoS−R
s
S − 1)(|hSm|
2 − σ2Sm). Considering
2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0, one can conclude that ZSm approaches to zero
with the probability of one. Hence, we have
P IC-USSSe-int = Pr
(
|hSe|
2|hMm|
2
|hMe|2ΛdSσ
2
MmγM + Λ
d
Sσ
2
Mm
> 1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
σ2Sex
σ2MeΛ
d
SγM + σ
2
Sex
exp(−x−
ΛdS
σ2Sex
)dx,
(51)
for 2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0. Similar (38), an overall intercept probability
for the proposed IC-USS scheme is obtained as
P IC-USSint = P
IC-USS
Me-int × P
IC-USS
Se-int , (52)
where P IC-USSMe-int and P
IC-USS
Se-int are given by (49) and (51), respec-
tively.
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY GAIN ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the secrecy diversity gain analysis
for the conventional OSS and IL-USS as well as the proposed
IC-USS schemes by characterizing an asymptotic behavior of
the outage probability with an intercept probability constraint
in the high SNR region. To be specific, we first analyze an
asymptotic outage probability as a function of the intercept
probability with γM → ∞, and then derive the secrecy
diversity gain as a ratio of the logarithmic asymptotic outage
probability to the logarithmic SNR γM , as mathematically
described below
ds = − lim
γM→∞
logPout (γM , Pint)
log γM
, (53)
where Pout (γM , Pint) represents an outage probability as a
function of SNR γM and an intercept probability constraint
Pint.
A. Conventional OSS
This subsection analyzes the secrecy diversity gain of con-
ventional OSS scheme, which is described as
dOSSs = − limγM→∞
log
(
POSSout
)
log γM
, (54)
where POSSout is the outage probability of OSS scheme as given
by (37). Substituting POSSout from (37) into (54) gives
dOSSs = − limγM→∞
log
(
POSSMm-out · P
OSS
Ss-out
)
log γM
. (55)
From (35) and (36), we can have
2
RoM
α = 2
RsM
α
(
1− γMσ
2
Me lnP
OSS
Me-int
)
, (56)
and
2
RoS
1−α
= 2
RsS
1−α
(
1− γSσ
2
Se lnP
OSS
Se-int
)
. (57)
Substituting 2
RoM
α and 2
RoS
1−α
from (56) and (57), respectively,
into (32) and (34) yields
POSSMm-out = 1− exp

−2
RsM
α
(
1− γMσ
2
Me lnP
OSS
Me-int
)
− 1
γMσ2Mm

 ,
(58)
and
POSSSs-out = 1− exp

−2
RsS
1−α
(
1− γSσ
2
Se lnP
OSS
Se-int
)
− 1
γSσ2Ss

 .
(59)
From (58), one can readily obtain
lim
γM→∞
POSSMm-out = 1− (P
OSS
Me-int)
2(R
s
M/α)σ2Me/σ
2
Mm , (60)
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where POSSMe-int is an intercept probability required for macro-
cell transmissions. Similarly, denoting γS = βγM wherein
0 ≤ β ≤
σ2Mm
σ2Sm
as implied from (20), we have
lim
γM→∞
POSSSs-out = 1− (P
OSS
Se-int)
2R
s
S/(1−α)σ2Se/σ
2
Ss , (61)
where POSSSe-int is a required intercept probability for small-cell
transmissions. One can readily observe from (60) and (61)
that the outage probabilities for both macro-cell and small-
cell transmissions are decreasing functions with regard to the
intercept probability, showing a tradeoff between the security
and reliability. Moreover, as the required intercept probabil-
ity decreases to zero, the corresponding outage probability
increases to one, and vice versa. Substituting POSSMm-out and
POSSSs-out from (60) and (61) into (55) gives
dOSSs = 0, (62)
which shows that the conventional OSS scheme achieves a
secrecy diversity order of zero. In other words, with a required
intercept probability constraint, the outage probability would
not approach to zero, as the SNR γM increases to infinity.
Hence, the conventional OSS scheme fails to make the overall
intercept probability and overall outage probability both drop
to zero with an increasing SNR.
B. Conventional IL-USS
In this subsection, we analyze the secrecy diversity gain of
conventional IL-USS scheme. Similarly to (55), the secrecy
diversity of conventional IL-USS scheme can be obtained from
(41) as
dIL-USSs = − lim
γM→∞
log
(
P IL-USSMm-out · P
IL-USS
Ss-out
)
log γM
, (63)
where P IL-USSMm-out and P
IL-USS
Ss-out are given by (39) and (40),
respectively. Denoting γS = βγM (0 ≤ β ≤
σ2Mm
σ2Sm
) and letting
γM →∞, we can simplify P
IL-USS
Me-int from (42) as
lim
γM→∞
P IL-USSMe-int =
σ2Me
σ2Me + βσ
2
Se(2
RoM−R
s
M − 1)
, (64)
which leads to
2R
o
M = 2R
s
M (1 +
ΦIL-USSMe
β
), (65)
where ΦIL-USSMe = (
1
P IL-USSMe-int
− 1)
σ2Me
σ2Se
. Using (43) and denoting
γS = βγM , we can similarly obtain
2R
o
S = 2R
s
S (1 + βΦIL-USSSe ), (66)
for γM →∞, where Φ
IL-USS
Se = (
1
P IL-USSSe-int
− 1)
σ2Se
σ2Me
. Substituting
2R
o
M and 2R
o
S from (65) and (66) into (39) and (40) yields
P IL-USSMm-out =
βσ2Sm(2
RsM − 1) + ΦIL-USSMe σ
2
Sm2
RsM
σ2Mm + βσ
2
Sm(2
RsM − 1) + ΦIL-USSMe σ
2
Sm2
RsM
,
(67)
and
P IL-USSSs-out =
σ2Ms(2
RsS − 1) + βΦIL-USSSe σ
2
Ms2
RsS
βσ2Ss + σ
2
Ms(2
RsS − 1) + βΦIL-USSSe σ
2
Ms2
RsS
, (68)
for γM → ∞. One can observe from (67) and (68) that
as the required intercept probability decreases to zero, the
parameters ΦIL-USSMe and Φ
IL-USS
Se increases to infinity, thus the
outage probabilities of macro-cell and small-cell transmissions
both increase to one. Combining (63), (67) and (68), we obtain
the secrecy diversity gain of conventional IL-USS as
dIL-USSs = 0, (69)
from which a secrecy diversity order of zero is achieved by
the conventional IL-USS scheme, implying that increasing
the transmit power γM would not force the overall outage
probability and intercept probability of conventional IL-USS
scheme to be arbitrarily low.
C. Proposed IC-USS
In this subsection, we present the secrecy diversity analysis
for proposed IC-USS scheme. Similarly to (55), the secrecy
diversity gain of proposed IC-USS scheme is obtained from
(47) as
dIC-USSs = − limγM→∞
log
(
P IC-USSMm-out · P
IC-USS
Ss-out
)
log γM
, (70)
where P IC-USSMm-out and P
IC-USS
Ss-out are given by (45) and (46),
respectively. Letting γM →∞ and using (48), we have
P IC-USSMe-int = Pr

 2
RsM (σ2Mmβ
−1 − σ2Sm)
|hSm|2 + |hMm|2|hSe|2|hMe|−2
> 2R
o
M − 2R
s
M

 , (71)
from which an arbitrarily small intercept probability can be
achieved by the macro-cell transmission relying on our IC-
USS scheme through increasing the overall rate RoM . In other
words, an overall data rate is always available to satisfy
an arbitrary intercept requirement P IC-USSMe-int , regardless of γM ,
which is denoted by RoM (P
IC-USS
Me-int ) for short. Considering
2R
o
Mσ2Sm → 0 and using (49), the overall rate R
o
M (P
IC-USS
Me-int )
should satisfy the following equality
P IC-USSMe-int −Θlim exp(Θlim)Ei(Θlim) = 0, (72)
where Θlim is given by
Θlim =
σ2Mmσ
2
Me − βσ
2
Smσ
2
Me2
RoM(P
IC-USS
Me-int)−R
s
M
βσ2Mmσ
2
Se(2
RoM(P
IC-USS
Me-int)−R
s
M − 1)
, (73)
for γM → ∞. Meanwhile, letting γM → ∞ and ignoring
higher-order infinitesimal, we can simplify (45) as
P IC-USSMm-out =
2R
o
M − 1
σ2Mm − σ
2
Smβ
· (
1
γM
). (74)
Considering an arbitrarily low intercept probability P IC-USSMe-int
and substituting the overall rate RoM (P
IC-USS
Me-int ) into (74) yields
P IC-USSMm-out =
2R
o
M(P
IC-USS
Me-int) − 1
σ2Mm − σ
2
Smβ
· (
1
γM
). (75)
Using (75) and noting the overall rate RoM (P
IC-USS
Me-int ) irrelevant
to γM , we can obtain
lim
γM→∞
log(P IC-USSMm-out)
log γM
= −1. (76)
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Moreover, letting γM → ∞, the intercept probability of
small-cell transmissions for our IC-USS scheme is obtained
from (50) as
P IC-USSSe-int = Pr


|hSe|
2|hMm|
2
|hMe|2(σ2Mm + β|hSm|
2 − βσ2Sm)
>
(2R
o
S−R
s
S − 1)
β

 , (77)
which shows an overall data rate as denoted by RoS(P
IC-USS
Se-int ) is
available to guarantee an arbitrary small intercept probability
P IC-USSMe-int , regardless of γM . Considering 2
RoSσ2Sm → 0 and
using (51), the overall rate RoS(P
IC-USS
Se-int ) can be obtained by
solving the following equality
1−ΨSe exp(ΨSe)Ei(ΨSe)− P
IC-USS
Se-int = 0, (78)
where ΨSe is given by
ΨSe =
σ2Me2
RoS(P
IC-USS
Se-int ) − σ2Me2
RsS
βσ2Se2
RsS
.
Similarly, letting γM → ∞, we can obtain the outage proba-
bility of small-cell transmissions for our IC-USS scheme from
(25) as
P IC-USSSs-out = Pr


|hSs|
2|hMm|
2
|hMs|2(σ2Mm + β|hSm|
2 − βσ2Sm)
<
(2R
o
S − 1)
β

 , (79)
from which an outage probability floor is converged with a
target overall data rate RoS(P
IC-USS
Se-int ) of guaranteeing a required
intercept probability. This means that with an arbitrary small
intercept probability requirement, it is impossible to achieve
an arbitrary low outage probability for the small cell relying
on our IC-USS scheme. Considering 2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0 and using
(46), we have
P IC-USSSs-out = ΨSs exp(ΨSs)Ei(ΨSs), (80)
for γM → ∞, where ΨSs = σ
2
Ms(2
RoS − 1)/(βσ2Ss). It can
be observed from (80) that with a target overall data rate
RoS(P
IC-USS
Se-int ), the outage probability would not be arbitrarily
small, as the SNR γM approaches to the infinity, which, in
turn, leads to
lim
γM→∞
log(P IC-USSSs-out )
log γM
= 0. (81)
Finally, by combining (76) and (81) with (70), the secrecy
diversity gain of proposed IC-USS scheme is given by
dIC-USSs = 1, (82)
which indicates that the proposed IC-USS scheme can achieve
the secrecy diversity order of one higher than both the conven-
tional OSS and IL-USS schemes. This also implies that with an
arbitrarily low overall intercept probability, the overall outage
probability of proposed IC-USS scheme would asymptotically
decrease to zero, as the SNR γM increases to infinity. As a
consequence, with an increasing SNR of γM , the proposed
IC-USS scheme can make the overall outage probability and
overall intercept probability both drop to zero, showing its
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Fig. 2. Overall outage probability versus overall intercept probability of OSS,
IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for different secrecy rates of Rs
M
= Rs
S
= 0.4
and 0.8 bit/s/Hz by adjusting the overall data rates of Ro
M
= Ro
S
in the range
of [Rs
M
, 5], where solid lines and discrete markers represent the theoretical
and simulation results, respectively.
significant advantage over the conventional OSS and IL-USS
methods from an SRT perspective.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical performance compar-
isons among the conventional OSS and IL-USS methods as
well as the proposed IC-USS scheme in terms of their overall
outage probability and intercept probability. In our numerical
evaluation, we consider σ2Mm = σ
2
Ss = σ
2
Me = σ
2
Se = 1, in
which the eavesdropper is assumed to experience the same
fading gain as the MU and SU. Since a small cell may
be deployed in a shadowed area (e.g., underground parking
garage, tunnel, etc.) of the macro cell, a fading gain of
σ2Ms = σ
2
Sm = 0.1 is considered for interference channels
between the small cell and macro cell. Also, an SNR of
γM = 25 dB, a secrecy data rate of R
s
M = R
s
S = 0.5 bit/s/Hz
and α = β = 0.5 are used, unless otherwise stated. Addi-
tionally, simulated intercept probability and outage probability
results of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes are also provided
through Monte-Carlo simulation to verify our theoretical SRT
analysis, where theoretical SRT results are obtained by plotting
(37), (38), (41), (44), (47) and (52).
Fig. 2 shows the overall outage probability versus overall
intercept probability of the conventional OSS and IL-USS
methods as well as the proposed IC-USS scheme for different
secrecy rates of RsM = R
s
S = 0.4 and 0.8 bit/s/Hz, where
solid lines and discrete markers represent the theoretical and
simulation results, respectively. As observed in Fig. 2, with
an increasing overall intercept probability, the overall outage
probabilities of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes decrease
and vice versa, showing a tradeoff between the security and
reliability, called security-reliability tradeoff (SRT). Fig. 2
also shows that as the secrecy rate increases from RsM =
RsS = 0.4 to 0.8 bit/s/Hz, the SRT performance of OSS,
IL-USS and IC-USS degrades accordingly, and the proposed
IC-USS scheme performs better than the conventional OSS
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Fig. 3. Overall outage probability versus overall intercept probability of OSS,
IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for different SNRs of γM = 20 and 25 dB
by adjusting the overall data rates of Ro
M
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S
in the range of [Rs
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where solid lines and discrete markers represent the theoretical and simulation
results, respectively.
and IL-USS methods. Moreover, the theoretical and simulated
SRT results of Fig. 2 generally match well, verifying the
correctness of our derived closed-form expressions of overall
outage probability and intercept probability. It is noted that
when the overall intercept probability is small, the gap between
the theoretical and simulated overall outage probabilities of
proposed IC-USS becomes obvious. This is because that with
a continuously decreasing intercept probability, the overall
data rates of RoM and R
o
S increase to be sufficiently high
such that the asymptotic assumptions of 2R
o
Mσ2Sm → 0 and
2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0 become no longer valid, resulting in an accuracy
loss of our derived outage probability and intercept probability
expressions of (46), (49) and (51) for IC-USS scheme.
Fig. 3 depicts the overall outage probability versus overall
intercept probability of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for
different SNRs of γM = 20 and 25 dB. One can observe from
Fig. 3 that as the SNR γM increases from 20 to 25 dB, the SRT
performance of IL-USS and IC-USS improves accordingly,
whereas no improvement is achieved by the OSS scheme.
This is because that although increasing the transmit power
improves the transmission reliability in terms of decreasing
the outage probability of a legitimate receiver, it also results
in an improved signal reception at the eavesdropper along
with a degraded security performance. Overall speaking, no
SRT benefit is attained by the OSS scheme, considering
the eavesdropper having the same fading gain as the MU
and SU (i.e., σ2Mm = σ
2
Ss = σ
2
Me = σ
2
Se = 1). By
contrast, in the IL-USS and IC-USS approaches, the macro
cell and small cell interfere with each other and increasing
the transmit power would cause higher interference to the
eavesdropper as well as the MU and SU, leading to a secrecy
improvement at the cost of degrading the reliability. Moreover,
with an increased transmit power of PM , the eavesdropper
encounters more interference than the legitimate MU and SU,
since the interference channel gains of σ2Ms = σ
2
Sm = 0.1
are much smaller than the eavesdropping channel gains of
σ2Me = σ
2
Se = 1. Therefore, as the SNR γM increases from
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Fig. 4. Intercept and outage probability (IOP) versus SNR γM of OSS, IL-
USS and IC-USS schemes, where solid lines and discrete markers represent
the theoretical and simulation results, respectively.
20 to 25 dB, the secrecy improvement dominates over the
reliability degradation for both IL-USS and IC-USS schemes,
leading to their SRT improvements. Additionally, as seen from
Fig. 3, with an increased SNR of γM , the SRT enhancement
of proposed IC-USS is much more significant than that of
IL-USS, which is due to the fact that our IC-USS scheme is
sophisticatedly designed to alleviate the interference problem
by canceling out the SBS-MU interference.
In Fig. 4, we show the sum of overall intercept probability
and outage probability (as denoted by IOP for short) versus
the SNR γM of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for
different interference channel gains of σ2Ms = σ
2
Sm = 0.1
and 0.2. It needs to be pointed out that given an SNR γM , the
numerical IOP results of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes
are minimized by adjusting the overall data rates of RoM and
RoS . As shown in Fig. 4, with an increasing SNR γM , the IOP
of conventional OSS method almost keeps unchanged, further
verifying that no SRT improvement is obtained by the OSS
scheme in the case of σ2Mm = σ
2
Ss = σ
2
Me = σ
2
Se = 1. Fig.
4 also shows that as the SNR γM increases, the IOP of IL-
USS scheme initially decreases and then converges to a floor,
while the proposed IC-USS scheme continuously decreases the
IOP significantly. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that with an
increasing SNR γM , the performance advantage of proposed
IC-USS scheme over conventional OSS and IL-USS methods
becomes more significant in terms of their IOPs. In addition,
as the interference channel gains of σ2Ms and σ
2
Sm increase
from 0.1 to 0.2, the IOP performance of IL-USS worsens
substantially, whereas our IC-USS scheme is very resistant
to the interference channels without an IOP degradation. Fig.
4 further demonstrates an obvious gap between the theoretical
and simulated IOP results in the high SNR region for our
IC-USS scheme in the case of σ2Ms = σ
2
Sm = 0.2, which
is because that the asymptotic assumptions of 2R
o
Mσ2Sm → 0
and 2R
o
Sσ2Sm → 0 used in our theoretical SRT analysis for
IC-USS become invalid, as the interference channel gain of
σ2Sm increases.
Fig. 5 illustrates the overall outage probability versus SNR
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Fig. 5. Overall outage probability versus SNR γM of OSS, IL-USS and
IC-USS schemes for different individual intercept probability constraints of
Pint = 0.1 and 0.01 for both the macro-cell and small-cell transmissions.
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Fig. 6. Exact and asymptotic overall outage probabilities versus SNR γM
of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes with a required individual intercept
probability constraint of Pint = 0.05.
γM of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes for different
individual intercept probability constraints of Pint = 10
−1
and Pint = 10
−2, where the intercept probabilities of macro-
cell and small-cell transmissions each shall be less than a
required level. As shown in Fig. 5, as the intercept prob-
ability requirement relaxes from 10−2 to 10−1, the overall
outage probabilities of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes
all decrease and the proposed IC-USS scheme achieves the
best outage performance with a given SNR. Additionally, as
the SNR γM increases, the conventional OSS and IL-USS
methods converge to their respective outage probability floors,
whereas the overall outage performance of proposed IC-USS
scheme continuously improves without the floor effect.
In Fig. 6, we show the exact and asymptotic overall out-
age probabilities versus SNR of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS
schemes with a required intercept probability constraint, where
the asymptotic overall outage probabilities are obtained by
using (60), (61), (67), (68), (72), (75), (78) and (80). It is
shown from Fig. 6 that the asymptotic outage probability
curves of OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes converge to
their respective exact outage results, as the SNR γM increases.
This is because that the derivation of our asymptotic SRT
expressions takes into account the assumption of γM → ∞.
One can also observe from Fig. 6 that with an increasing SNR
γM , the proposed IC-USS scheme can make its overall outage
probability decrease significantly with a required intercept
probability constraint. This means that the SRT performance
of proposed IC-USS scheme can be continuously improved by
simply increasing the transmit power.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated physical-layer security for a
heterogeneous spectrum-sharing cellular network consisting of
a macro cell and a small cell in the presence of a common
eavesdropper. We proposed an IC-USS scheme to improve
transmission security of the heterogeneous cellular network
against eavesdropping, where both the macro cell and small
cell are allowed to simultaneously transmit over their shared
spectrum along with mutual interference induced between each
other. A special signal was designed in the proposed IC-USS
scheme to alleviate an adverse effect of the mutual interference
on an intended user while severely degrading the eavesdropper.
Conventional OSS and IL-USS methods were considered for
the purpose of performance comparisons. We derived closed-
form expressions of overall outage probability and intercept
probability for the OSS, IL-USS and IC-USS schemes. We
also conducted the secrecy diversity analysis for OSS, IL-
USS and IC-USS schemes and showed that the proposed IC-
USS scheme achieves a higher secrecy diversity gain than
the OSS and IL-USS methods. Additionally, numerical results
demonstrated that the IC-USS scheme performs better than
the conventional OSS and IL-USS methods in terms of their
SRT performance. More importantly, with an arbitrarily low
intercept probability, the overall outage probabilities of con-
ventional OSS and IL-USS methods converge to their respec-
tive outage floors, whereas the proposed IC-USS scheme can
make its overall outage probability asymptotically decrease to
zero, as the SNR increases to infinity.
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